Agentic systems introduce a new attack surface: autonomous decision-making. Traditional perimeter security assumes static applications with predictable flows. Agents break both assumptions.
TealTiger applies security governance at execution time, where risk actually materializes.
The Threat Model Shift
- Perimeter
- Authentication
- Authorization
- Static Application
- Identity
- Per-Step Authorization
- Tool Gating
- Data Boundary
- Output Inspection
- Cost Containment
Traditional security asks: “Who is making this request?”
Agentic security must also ask: “Should this agent perform this action, with this tool, on this data, right now?”
A trusted internal agent can still:
- invoke the wrong tool (or the right tool with wrong arguments)
- exfiltrate sensitive data in “helpful” responses
- follow prompt-injected instructions
- burn through budgets via runaway loops
TealTiger Security Controls
1. Identity-Bound Execution
Every agent action is bound to a verifiable identity. No anonymous execution.
Identity includes:
- Agent type and version
- Execution environment (dev/staging/prod)
- Tenant and workflow context
- Correlation ID for traceability
2. Least-Privilege Tooling
Agents can only invoke tools explicitly granted by policy. Everything else is denied.
| Principle | Implementation |
|---|---|
| Default deny | No tool access unless explicitly allowed |
| Scoped permissions | Tools allowed per environment, workflow, agent type |
| Parameter constraints | Arguments validated against policy rules |
| Approval gates | High-risk tools require human approval |
3. Deterministic Deny-by-Default
Anything not explicitly allowed is denied. No implicit trust, no “the model decided it was safe.”
Every deny produces:
- A stable reason code (
TOOL_NOT_ALLOWED,SCOPE_VIOLATION,DATA_BOUNDARY_EXCEEDED) - Policy version that made the decision
- Context snapshot for audit
4. Output Egress Controls
Security doesn’t end at tool invocation. Outputs must be inspected before leaving the system:
Security Outcomes
- Reduced blast radius — agents cannot escalate beyond approved boundaries
- Enforced separation of duties — different agents have different permissions
- Audit-ready security logs — every decision is traceable and replayable
- No silent escalation — privilege creep is structurally prevented
Practical Checklist
- Bind every agent to a verifiable identity
- Default-deny all tool access; allowlist explicitly
- Validate tool arguments against policy constraints
- Inspect outputs before egress (redact/block/approve)
- Emit reason-coded evidence for every security decision
- Scope permissions by environment, tenant, and workflow
Related
- Zero Trust Across Governance Hubs — Zero Trust as a governance pattern
- Runtime Governance — Enforcement at execution boundaries
- Evidence & Audit — Proving security decisions